To examine the association between payer status (Medicaid vs. private-pay) and the risk of hospitalizations among long-term stay nursing home (NH) residents who reside in the same facility.
T he frequency of hospitalizations of nursing home (NHs) residents is a significant financial and health concern. NH residents are generally old, frail, and in poor health. Thus the interruption in care and transition between NHs and hospitals can cause significant physical and psychological deterioration. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] Furthermore, many of these hospitalizations are potentially unnecessary or avoidable, 1, [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] which leads to a significant financial burden on the Medicare program. Reducing unnecessary hospitalizations in the NH population is a focus of the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). Understanding the mechanisms underlying these hospitalizations, including identifying populations most vulnerable to these hospitalizations, is crucial to achieve the goal of reducing hospitalizations in NHs.
Medicaid residents account for the largest long-term care population in NHs. 13 The NH Medicaid policies, however, may provide incentives for NHs to hospitalize Medicaid residents. For instance, Medicaid reimbursement rates, which are usually set prospectively, are generally lower than private payment rates 13, 14 and less likely to cover costs if a resident requires intensive medical care due to an exacerbation of their conditions or an acute episode. Medicaid bed-hold policies, which reimburse NHs for holding the bed for a Medicaid resident when hospitalized (there is no such policy for private-pay residents), 15 could provide additional incentives for NHs to hospitalize Medicaid residents. [15] [16] [17] Under these Medicaid NH policies, Medicaid residents may experience higher risks of hospitalization through 2 mechanisms: 1 possibility is that NHs with many Medicaid residents do not have the resources to provide onsite intensive care, and therefore may have no choice but to transfer their residents to hospitals (referred as across-facility variations). Alternatively, Medicaid residents may be more likely to be hospitalized because it is less costly (and thus more profitable) for facilities to transfer them to a hospital for treatment than to provide intensive care onsite, even when resources are available. This second scenario suggests that Medicaid patients will be more likely to be hospitalized than private-pay residents in the same facility (referred as within-facility differences). While some studies have suggested across-facility variations in hospitalizations between Medicaid and private-pay residents, 15, 16, 18, 19 relatively few studies are focused on whether NHs make different hospitalization decisions for Medicaid and private-pay residents within the same facility. 20 It is important to differentiate between these 2 possible mechanisms because the policy implications of each may be different. For example, while across-facility variation may suggest increased investment in poor-resource NHs (ie, NHs with a high proportion of Medicaid residents), simply investment in resources may not be effective if within-facility differences exist. If the higher hospitalization rates experienced by Medicaid residents are related to NHs' inherent financial incentives (transferring a Medicaid patient to hospital is more profitable than providing onsite care), it will be necessary to use an appropriate approach to incentivize NHs to promote equal care among NH residents with different payer status. Otherwise, some NHs may always have incentives to hospitalize their Medicaid residents regardless of their capability to provide such care.
The objective of this study is to examine the difference in hospitalization risks between Medicaid and private-pay residents within the same facility. By using national data (ie, from January 01, 2007 to September 30, 2010) , this study also examines whether the within-facility differences in hospitalizations between Medicaid and private-pay residents vary between discretionary and nondiscretionary hospitalizations. Financial incentives are less likely to affect hospitalization decisions for conditions that are considered nondiscretionarywhen hospitalization is the standard of care for the condition (eg, acute myocardial infarction), compared with discretionary conditions-when there is no agreement about the necessity of hospitalization (eg, congestive heart failure). 11, [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] Hence, the different relationship between Medicaid payer status and discretionary versus nondiscretionary hospitalizations will provide more robust evidence on the impact of financial incentives on NHs' hospitalization decisions.
METHODS

Data
The national Medicare beneficiary summary file, Medicare claims (including inpatient claims, skilled nursing facility claims, home health claims, hospice claims, and outpatient claims) and the Minimum Data Set (MDS) 2.0 between January 1, 2007 and September 30, 2010 were linked and compiled into a "residential history file" to track each individual through health care locations, including the transition between home, skilled nursing facility, nursing facilities, and hospitals. 27 The MDS is a federally mandated assessment tool for all residents in Medicare-certified and/or Medicaid-certified NHs. The MDS contains detailed information on individual sociodemographic characteristics and health conditions.
Cohort
The study included NH residents 65 years old or older, who were enrolled in Medicare fee-for-service and were newly admitted to NHs between July 1, 2007 and January 1, 2010. A resident was considered newly admitted to a NH if he or she did not have any NH stay in the prior 6 months before the NH admission. If a resident had multiple qualified "new admissions," we randomly selected one of them. Among those who were newly admitted, we only focused on those who became NH long-stayers (ie, who stayed in the NH for at least 100 d after the initial NH admission) so that residents were more homogenous in terms of their needs of care. We considered the date representing 100 days after the initial admission to be the "baseline" date. We then followed these residents for another 180 days after the baseline date (in other words, a resident was followed for 280 d after the initial NH admission). We used a 180-day window so that our findings could be compared with prior studies. 16, 18, 19, 28 In total, we identified 841,388 newly admitted long-stay residents. Among these long-stayers, 49.8% (N = 419,134) had Medicaid as the payment source at the baseline date, 17.5% (N = 147,287) spent down to Medicaid during the course of their NH stay, and the rest of the residents were considered as private-pay (Medicare does not pay for longterm care in NHs). We did not differentiate residents who were paid by other payer, such as Veterans, as they only accounted a very small proportion of the residents in Medicare-certified and/or Medicaid-certified NHs. We excluded residents who spent-down to Medicaid because these residents had their NH stay covered both by Medicaid (after spend-down) and other private source (before spend-down). We further restricted our analysis to facilities with at least 20 qualified individuals. Therefore, the final analytical sample included 651,507 residents (396,090 Medicaid residents and 255,417 private-pay residents) in 13,109 facilities. (The proportion of private-pay residents seems to be higher than the prevalence of private-pay residents estimated by other sources. This may be due to the identification of this cohort, which only included those who were newly admitted to NHs and stayed for at least 100 d. The longer a resident stays in a NH, the more likely he/she spends-down to Medicaid.)
Outcome Variables
Three dichotomous outcomes of NH originating hospitalizations were defined. The first outcome variable was defined as any acute hospitalization (all-cause hospitalizations) from a NH within 180 days versus none after the baseline date. The second outcome variable was defined as any nondiscretionary hospitalization from a NH within a 180-day follow-up window after the baseline date. A hospitalization was defined as nondiscretionary if hospitalization is the standard of care for the condition. On the basis of the literature, we considered a hospitalization as nondiscretionary if the admission diagnoses fell within the following set of diagnoses: acute myocardial infarction, hip fracture, respiratory failure, subdural hemorrhage, concussion, severe infection (ie, sepsis, meningitis, endocarditis), gastrointestinal bleeding, and stroke appendectomy. 26, 29 The third outcome variable was defined as any discretionary hospitalization from a NH within a 180-day window after the baseline date. We considered a hospitalization as discretionary when there is no clear agreement in the necessity of hospitalization for the medical condition (ie, pneumonia, congestive heart failure, hypertension, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and urinary tract infection). 11, [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] As a sensitivity analysis, we also used 2 additional approaches to define the discretionary hospitalizations (see the Sensitivity analysis section).
Independent Variable of Interest
Individual payer status was jointly determined by the MDS, Medicare denominator file, and Medicare SNF claims. 30 We used Medicare SNF claims to determine whether the NH stay was covered by Medicare. If a resident's NH stay was not covered by Medicare and the resident was not eligible for Medicaid, we considered the payer source for her/his NH stay as private-pay.
Covariates
Individual sociodemographic characteristics (eg, age, sex, race, and education) were obtained from Medicare beneficiary summary file and the MDS data. Individual treatment preferences (eg, do-not-hospitalization order and do-not-resuscitate order) and health status (eg, activities of daily living, cognitive impairment score, comorbidities) were obtained from the most recent MDS assessment before the baseline date. We also controlled for the history of health care utilization (eg, number of hospitalization) 180 days before the initial NH admission and during the first 100 NH days after the initial admission (ie, before they became long-stayers). Lastly, we accounted for secular trends (ie, 2007-2010) by including indicators for the years of the baseline date.
Statistical Analysis
We estimated a linear probability model with facility fixed-effects and robust SE to test the differences in hospitalizations between Medicaid and private-pay residents within a facility. We chose to use linear probability model because of its computational efficiency (ie, our large data sample size and >10,000 fixed-effects) and more importantly, because of its easy interpretation (ie, the direct marginal effect of payer status on probability of being hospitalized). The linear probability model approximates the response probability and provides a good estimate of the marginal effect on the response probability near the center of the distribution of independent variables. 31 The linear probability model with facility fixed-effects accounts for facility (and state) factors that are invariant to residents who resided in the same facility of the distribution of facility effects and the relationship between facility effects and other independent variables.
Three separate models were used to examine the relationship between Medicaid payer status and all-cause hospitalizations, discretionary, and nondiscretionary hospitalizations, respectively, controlling for individual covariates and secular trends. We expected Medicaid payment status to be related to a higher probability of all-cause hospitalizations and discretionary hospitalization, but not for nondiscretionary hospitalizations. We also tested the difference in the effect of Medicaid payer status on discretionary hospitalization versus nondiscretionary hospitalization. Lastly, to examine whether survival time will bias the relationship between Medicaid payer status and the probability of hospitalizations, we stratified NH residents by those who died within the 180-day observational window and those who survived the observational window, and repeated the analysis of the relationship between Medicaid payer status and allcause hospitalizations.
Sensitivity Analysis
We performed a set of sensitivity analyses. First, we used 2 alternative approaches to define discretionary hospitalizations: (1) any hospitalizations that did not qualify as nondiscretionary hospitalizations; and (2) any hospitalizations for conditions that were considered to be discretionary in CMS's Nursing Home Value-Based Purchasing demo (ie, heart failure, respiratory infection, electrolyte imbalance, sepsis, urinary tract infection, or anemia). Second, we defined the study cohort as any NH long-stayers in 2009 (we used 1 y of data due to the large population), randomly selected one quarterly/annual assessment as the baseline, and followed them for 180 days. Lastly, we repeated the main analyses by conditional fixed-effects logit models to check the potential discrepancy between a linear probability model (with fixedeffects) and fixed-effects logit model.
RESULTS
Descriptive Analyses
The overall prevalence of all-cause hospitalization during a 180-day follow-up period was 23.3% among Medicaid residents compared with 21.6% among private-pay residents. The overall prevalence of nondiscretionary hospitalizations was 2.46% among Medicaid residents versus 2.50% among private-pay residents. The prevalence of discretionary hospitalizations was 4.22% among Medicaid residents versus 4.21% among private-pay residents ( Table 1) .
As presented in Table 1 , on average, Medicaid residents were 2 years younger than private residents. The prevalence of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease/asthma, stroke, diabetes, and mental conditions was higher among Medicaid residents than among private-pay residents. However, the prevalence of congestive heart failure was similar among the Medicaid residents and private-pay residents, and Medicaid residents had lower prevalence of other heart conditions (eg, arteriosclerotic heart disease, cardiac dysrhythmias, peripheral vascular disease) than private-pay residents. While Medicaid residents were more likely to have severe cognitive impairment as compared with private-pay residents, their physical functional status appeared to be similar as that of private-pay residents (activities of daily living score was 16.22 for Medicaid residents and 16.52 for private-pay residents).
Multivariate Analysis
As shown in Table 2 , after accounting for individual characteristics and facility effects, the probability of being hospitalized among Medicaid residents was 1.8-percentage point (P < 0.01) higher than that among private-pay residents within the same facility. In other words, Medicaid payer status was associated with 8% increase in the probability of hospitalization rates as compared with private-pay residents (calculated as 1.8% divided by 21.6%, which was the average hospitalization rates for private-pay residents).
The regression on nondiscretionary hospitalizations revealed no significant difference in these hospitalizations between Medicaid and private-pay residents, as expected. In contrast, Medicaid payer status was associated with 0.22percentage point higher (P < 0.01) in the probability of hospitalizations compared with the private-pay patients for the discretionary hospitalizations. This was approximately 5% increase in the rates of these hospitalizations relative to the rates experienced by private-pay residents in the same facility (calculated as 0.22% divided by 4.21%, which was overall rates for discretionary hospitalizations among private-pay residents). The coefficient of Medicaid payer status estimated from discretionary hospitalizations was significantly different from that estimated from nondiscretionary hospitalizations (P < 0.05). Table 3 displays the results from the analysis in which we compared the probability of all-cause hospitalization for "survivor" and "decedents." Consistent with our expectations, Medicaid residents were more likely to be hospitalized from a NH than private-pay residents in the same facility-the probability of being hospitalized for Medicaid residents was 2.2% and 2.8% point higher than that for private-pay residents among "survivors" and "decedents," respectively. The difference in these 2 probabilities was marginally significant (P = 0.1). In other words, as compared with private-pay residents, the increase in the likelihood of NH originating hospitalizations was higher among Medicaid "decedents" than "survivors." Table 1 because some variables have missing values.
BMI indicates body mass index; CPS, cognitive performance scale; NH, nursing home.
Sensitivity Analyses
The findings from the sensitivity analyses were consistent with the main analyses. The effect size of payer status on hospitalizations based on a cohort of any NH long-stayers was similar to the main analysis, and findings from conditional logit models were similar to the main analyses. The findings from the alternative definitions of discretionary hospitalizations were consistent with the main findings.
DISCUSSION
To our knowledge, this study is the first national study to explore the differences in hospitalizations between Medicaid and private-pay residents within a facility. We found that Medicaid residents had a higher probability of all-cause hos-pitalizations and discretionary hospitalizations than did similar private-pay residents residing in the same facility. We did not find Medicaid residents to have a higher probability of nondiscretionary hospitalization, supporting the hypothesis that financial incentives play a role in the higher hospitalization rates observed for Medicaid residents rather than unmeasured severity. We considered hospitalizations among private-pay residents as the baseline rate in a facility assuming that NHs had no or less incentive to hospitalize private-pay residents as they were generally more profitable than Medicaid residents and to our knowledge, were not subject to the bed-hold policy. Therefore, the hospitalization rates among private-pay residents were more likely to reflect the facility's ability to provide onsite intensive care, and the difference in the probability of hospitalizations between Medicaid and private-pay residents could be attributable to payer status-related financial incentives. The extra hospitalizations experienced by Medicaid residents are likely to be unnecessary as they are not directly related to individual clinical needs. NH residents are generally in poor health, having complex medical conditions, and are usually on complex medication and treatment regimens. 32 Transitions between NHs and hospitals can lead to significant disruption of care resulting in medication errors and/or other quality deficiencies. Moreover, hospitalization exposes frail elderly to nosocomial infections, which may not only lead to further deterioration in individual health status, but also to longer stay in hospitals. These unnecessary hospitalizations also incur considerable financial burden on the Medicare program. A recent report by the Office of Inspector General revealed that 24.8% NH residents were hospitalized in FY2011, at a cost of $14.3 billion to Medicare. 33 The 1.8 percentage point increase in hospitalization rates detected in this study translates into approximately $1 billion increase in expenditure on Medicare for the hospitalization costs. It is noteworthy that we are likely to underestimate the extent of potentially unnecessary hospitalizations experienced by Medicaid residents as the NH where a Medicaid resident receives her/ his care can also lead to unwanted hospitalizations-studies indicate that NHs with a higher proportion of Medicaid residents have fewer resources for providing intensive care and therefore are more likely to hospitalize all their residents. 16, 18 Reducing unnecessary hospitalizations among Medicaid residents is important for the Medicare program to achieve the purpose of reducing overall hospitalizations in NHs. Addressing these financial incentives to hospitalize Medicaid residents is becoming more important especially considering the expansion of the Medicaid population in the coming years under the Affordable Care Act. However, there is a long-standing conflict between Medicaid and Medicarewhereas Medicaid is the payer for long-term NH stays, Medicare pays for the inpatient care. 34 Therefore state Medicaid programs and NHs do not have incentives to make investment in reducing hospitalizations to save Medicare dollars. While several models, such as PACE and Evercare program, demonstrate the success of integrating Medicare and Medicaid funding to reduce hospitalizations among the elderly, these programs are not widely adopted in NHs. 35, 36 Furthermore, even the new care and financing models developed post-ACA do not address the issue. The Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) are designed to coordinate care among providers (eg, physicians and hospitals), who are responsible for caring for Medicare beneficiaries with multiple chronic disease conditions who need care across settings. Providers are incentivized to offer high quality and efficient care because "When an ACO succeeds both in both delivering highquality care and spending health care dollars more wisely, it will share in the savings it achieves for the Medicare program." 37 While this approach may be feasible and effective to improve care between hospital and skilled nursing facilities when caring for postacute care residents because both are reimbursed by Medicare, it does not extend to the NH long-stayers. These patients are "siloed" into Medicaid and the incentives in ACOs, which cross providers, do not cross payers. Thus the incentives to over hospitalize Medicaid patients remain even within ACOs.
Medicaid hospitalization of NH patients also does not benefit from the recent pay-for-performance movement. CMS has launched a Nursing Home Value-Based Purchasing Demonstration aiming to reduce hospitalizations in NHs. However, the program is targeted at Medicare beneficiaries who receive skilled nursing facility care (who are short-stayers) under Medicare Part A benefits. This does not apply to the NH long-stayers. While some state Medicaid programs have adopted pay-for-performance approaches to improve quality of care in NHs, they have not incorporated incentives to lower hospitalization rates because of the financial conflicts between Medicare and Medicaid. 38 Thus the reduction of extra hospitalizations experienced by Medicaid residents within a facility, which we found is independent of the availability of resources in a facility, will require policy considerations to reconciliatie Medicare and Medicaid financing.
Limitations
Several limitations need to be noted. First, although we had claims data and clinically enriched MDS data, it is possible that the findings might be confounded by unobserved factors. For example, if Medicaid residents were systematically sicker than private-pay residents, the difference in hospitalization rates between Medicaid and private-pay residents could be due to unobserved difference in health conditions, rather than Medicaid payer-status. However, based on the observed characteristics, there is no clear evidence that Medicaid residents were systematically sicker than private-pay residents-Medicaid residents were actually less likely to have prior inpatient events compared with private-pay residents (they both covered by Medicare for inpatient event). Further, the relationship between Medicaid payer status and nondiscretionary hospitalizations was close to 0, and was statistically smaller than the relationship with discretionary hospitalizations. If the increased probability of hospitalizations for Medicaid residents was led by unmeasured severity, we would expect a similar relationship between Medicaid payer status and nondiscretionary versus discretionary hospitalizations. 26 Secondly, we assumed that the occurrence of acute medical conditions was similar between Medicaid and private-pay residents within a facility conditional on their observed health conditions. This is likely to be true as a prior study indicated that there was no systematic difference in the quality of daily care (ie, prevention of pressure ulcers) delivered to Medicaid versus private-pay residents. 39 In conclusion, our findings support the hypothesis that the observed higher hospitalization rates for Medicaid NH residents are at least in part driven by the financial incentive NHs have to hospitalize (rather than care in house) Medicaid residents. These findings are especially relevant to today's Medicare program given the large number of Medicare and Medicaid dual-eligible residents in NHs and the continuous increase in Medicare spending. Future investment will be needed to understand how to redesign the Medicaid policies so that the financial incentives NHs have to hospitalize Medicaid residents can be altered.
